By M.H.Askari
There is a tendency to regard the crisis of 1971 as an isolated sporadic happening, resulting from the incapacity of politicians to share power, and aided and abetted by India’s ambition to extends its sphere of influence. The antecedents of the crisis are frequently forgotten. The latest expression of this attitude is the statement by Major General (retired) Rao Farman Ali Khan calling for a fresh commission comprising Supreme Court Judges to determine the political and military factors which went into the surrender on 16th December 1971 and the breakaway from East Pakistan.
He has focused on what he believes to be the self-serving motives of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Shaikh Mujibur Rehman during the 1971 crisis. It is seldom stated that the East Pakistan explosion was on a short fuse for almost a decade before it actually happened. ‘The Times’ of London as early as 1966 reported from Dhaka that “the force that underlies the political agitation (which was then growing in dimension) is the same that created Pakistan itself. The desire of an under group to improve its position by somehow stepping out from beneath those whom it believes to be exploiting or suppressing it”. Even G.W. Choudhury, a Bengali academic who was a member of Yahya Khan’s cabinet and has strongly defended his military action in East Pakistan, concedes that ‘Bengali sub-nationalism or regionalism was…the product of a number of unfortunate and, in a sense, accidental factors connected with the internal political developments in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly after the eclipse of the democratic process of the country which denied the Bengalis their due share in the political process, and created an artificial situation which the majority group felt itself dominated by an elite from West Pakistan composed of top civil and military officials.’ Professor Choudhury however is strongly of the view that while the Bengalis were naturally resentful of the state of affairs there was no fundamental cleavage between the Muslims of the two wings of Pakistan, the internal tensions were ‘utilized by the hostile neighbor of Pakistan which not only divided the two parts of the country geographically but took an active role in aggravating the internal tensions of the country in the twin expectation of weakening its principal enemy and belying Jinnah’s two-nation theory, neither of which seemed to have been achieved by the partition of 1971’.
The late Mr. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy whose commitment to Pakistan is beyond question has recorded in his memoirs that East Pakistan had carried certain important grievances which could not be resolved by the mere allocation of large funds for development. He mentions that the money spent for defense purposes was obviously provided by both wings, but it was estimated that 98 percent of it was spent in West Pakistan or for West Pakistan personnel.’ Hence, there was a constant drain of funds from East Pakistan without any return, leading to improvement of the eastern wing.
Another distinguished Bengali politician, Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, in his memoirs speaks of the growing sense of deprivation of East Pakistan and maintains that in view of the resentment expressed by East Pakistan leadership, ‘people like Ayub Khan started saying that if East Pakistan wanted to leave the federation there should be no serious objection from the people of West Pakistan.’ He felt that ‘unless both wings with their problems stood together both would suffer’ but also believed that Pakistan’s defense problems stood insoluble with the attitude of India remaining unfriendly.
The timing of Major General (Retired) Rao Farman Ali’s demand for the constitution of a commission on the lines of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission, to get down to the bottom of the actual facts of the 1971 debacle, is certainly intriguing. It happens to coincide with an intermittent campaign on the part of certain political leaders to establish the Bhutto family as unpatriotic, motivated by anti-Pakistan sentiments. In his reported statement, the retired Major-General has attempted to absolve the late Gen Yahya Khan and his junta of their responsibility and held Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the guilty party.
This is not to suggest that the fateful events of 1971 should not have been properly investigated and the findings made public. The fact that the Hamoodur Rahman Commission’s report was kept secret, resulting in speculation and conjecture, seemed too much like a deliberate cover up. Whether Bhutto alone was responsible for that is anybody’s guess.
Major-General (Retired) Farman Ali’s suggestion that another Commission could still identify the factors leading to Pakistan’s breakup certainly merits consideration. If nothing else, this could determine the wisdom (or otherwise) of the persistent belief that the induction of the Army is the only way out of a mess created by politicians. The proposed investigation could also perhaps establish the basis of certain charges levelled against the retired Major-General himself about his role in the events of 1971. Kazi Anwarul Huque, a distinguished Bengali Civil Servant who held several key appointments in both wings of Pakistan before the breakup and has been a member of Bangladesh’s Council of Ministers under three successive Presidents. In his memoirs he has held Rao Farman Ali guilty of incredible crime. He maintained that the two ‘fanatical’ non-Bengali organizations, allegedly organized by the Major General towards the tail end of the East Pakistan crisis, were responsible for the cold-blooded murder of a number of university teachers and other intellectuals of Dhaka shortly before the Pakistan Army surrendered on 16 December 1971. The organizations were ostensibly set up to eliminate prominent Bengalis who were suspected of having collaborated with the ‘liberation’ movement. If Kazi Anwarul Huque’s statement is to be believed, the victims were picked up from their homes, taken to the outskirts of the city and mercilessly butchered. Kazi Sahib goes on to agree that Rao Farman Ali had also allegedly ‘planned’ to liquidate senior Bengali officers to cripple the Bangladeshi government which was to succeed the Pakistan government but was prevented by Governor A.M. Malik from proceeding with the sinister plot. These or similar charges have been heard time and again and it is high time the retired Major General was given the opportunity to clear his name.
A view has been expressed; and Kazi Anwarul Huque who served as Minister in Ayub Khan’s Cabinet shares it- that the secession of East Pakistan had it seeds in the war of 1965. It is argued that the isolation of East Pakistan during the war and the futility of the West Pakistan based defense strategy planned by Ayub Khan compelled the leaders of East Pakistan ‘to seek a remedy by which the interests of the province could be safeguarded by their own efforts.’ East Pakistani leadership believed in ‘a calculated move’ the military oligarchy during Ayub Khan’s regime wanted to keep its disputes with India alive in order to maintain themselves in power, oblivious of the interest of East Pakistan. This may be an extreme view, but the fact is the Six points outlined by Shaikh Mujibur Rehman began to gain support in East Pakistan not too long after the 1965 war.
Shaikh Mujibur Rehman’s Six points indeed portended a radical change in the inter-relationship between East and West Pakistan. With the breakup of One Unit and the doing away of the artificial basis of parity established in the 1956 constitution and maintained in Ayub Khan’s political order, the likelihood of a government by East Pakistan stared the power elite in Pakistan in the face. When the election campaign got into full swing in the latter part of 1970, certain elements in the West Pakistan carried on the propaganda that Bengali Muslims were not truly committed to Islam and were under the social and cultural domination of Hindus and India. Shaikh Mujibur Rehman had to declare that his political program in no way jeopardized the integrity of Pakistan or Islam. When the Awami league secured a clear majority in the constituent assembly, there was stated to be serious concern among Yahya Khan’s aides on two counts: for the continuation of the central government’s effective power, over riding provincial autonomy, and, more importantly, possible political interference by East Pakistan leadership in the matter of maintaining a military budget at current levels and in regard to recruitment, postings and promotions in the defense establishment. The military junta apparently felt that these critical matters would have to be part of a negotiated settlement between the regime and the Awami League leadership. This then was the compulsion for Gen Yahya Khan and his colleagues to commence a dialogue with Shaikh Mujibur Rehman and his aides before convening the National Assembly.
According to research conducted by two notable American academics, Professor Richard Sisson of University of California, Los Angeles, and Prof Lee E. Rose of University of California, Berkeley, (whom Rao Farman Ali has referred to in support of his theory that Butto and Shaikh Mujibur Rehman were the primary culprits in the debacle of 1971) maintain that Yahya Khan and his aides (all military officers) did not anticipate that the 1971 elections would give a clear majority to two separate political parties, totally polarized in their positions on the future constitution of Pakistan, in the two wings of the country. The junta expected the elections would lead to ‘a party configuration that would facilitate the protection of their interests.’ They were hoping that there would be a multiplicity of parties in the National Assembly, with no single party being dominant, which would result in a coalition government and perhaps leave room for manipulation from above. This did not happen.
Nevertheless, in his first full fledged meeting with Yahya Khan and his aides in January 1971, Shaikh Mujibur Rehman proposed that ‘to facilitate a constitutional consensus the members of the National Assembly should meet in Dhaka to discuss a draft constitution several days before the convening of the National Assembly and the draft incorporating suggestions from West Pakistani leaders would then be prepared for Yahya Khan to present to the Assembly.’ (Sisson and Lee) The Awami League leader, ‘in an effort to assuage the fears of the military,’ also indicated that he ‘would accommodate the corporate interests of the Pakistani army as well as the personal political interests of President Yahya Khan.’ In addition, Shaikh Mujibur Rehman explicitly stated that he intended to make Yahya Khan the next ‘elected’ President of Pakistan and that he would not reduce the size of the army. He further held out the assurance that no one from West Pakistan would be dismissed from either the military or the Civil Services. While not committing himself to any specific form of government, Mujib nevertheless affirmed that he would not impose any unwanted constitutional arrangements on the West Pakistan provinces. Nevertheless, the military junta reportedly remained less than enthusiastic about the prospect of the Awami League assuming power. They apparently believed that once power was transferred, there would be no leverage against the Awami League without constitutional guarantees and ‘the effective participation of a dependable counterpoise in the government.’ However, Gen Yahya Khan at the end of the January talks spoke of Shaikh Mujibur Rehman as the future Prime Minister of Pakistan.
That Yahya Khan acting under his own whims or on the advice of his military brass which surrounded him or of Bhutto within a few days chose to behave [am—siacally] about the Dhaka talks was of course his own responsibility. He then gave his backing to negotiations being held between the leaders of the People’s Party and the Awami League, something that did not lead to consensus, and only widened the gulf between East and West Pakistan. Yahya Khan then chose to yield to pressure from the PPP and postponed the date for the convening of the National Assembly-something which the Awami league leadership regarded as a point of no return. In a last-ditch effort to avert a postponement and complete breakdown of negotiations, Admiral Ahsan and Sahabzada Yaqub Khan Rao Farman tried to reach Yahya Khan on phone in Rawalpindi on Feb 28 (the assembly was due to meet on March 3). They were reportedly told to call Karachi where they were informed by a senior member of Yahya Khan’s staff that the President was ‘indisposed’. Admiral Ahsan then spoke to Gen Hamid, Chief of Army Staff, in Sialkot, urging him to inform the President of the gravity of the situation. Hamid’s reported response was that he was not ‘conversant’ with political matters. Later the same night, Adm Ahsan was relieved of his duties as Governor of East Pakistan and replaced by Gen Yaqub Khan. Yaqub Khan himself was replaced by Gen Tikka Khan a few days later. The rest is history, too well chronicled to need repetition. However, when all the relevant antecedents are viewed in their perspective, they leave little reason to presume that the ultimate responsibility for the subsequent chain of events was that of anyone other than Yahya Khan as President, Chief Martial Law Administrator, and chief negotiator with the contending leadership.
(This article was found among M.H.Askari’s papers which were bequeathed to me, it was in all likelihood never published nor does it carry a date indicating the year it was written.)
Shama Askari
Who Dumped East Pakistan?
M.H.Askari
There is a tendency to regard the crisis of 1971 as an isolated sporadic happening, resulting from the incapacity of politicians to share power, and aided and abetted by India’s ambition to extends its sphere of influence. The antecedents of the crisis are frequently forgotten. The latest expression of this attitude is the statement by Major General (retired) Rao Farman Ali Khan calling for a fresh commission comprising Supreme Court Judges to determine the political and military factors which went into the surrender on 16th December 1971 and the breakaway from East Pakistan.
He has focused on what he believes to be the self-serving motives of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Shaikh Mujibur Rehman during the 1971 crisis. It is seldom stated that the East Pakistan explosion was on a short fuse for almost a decade before it actually happened. ‘The Times’ of London as early as 1966 reported from Dhaka that “the force that underlies the political agitation (which was then growing in dimension) is the same that created Pakistan itself. The desire of an under group to improve its position by somehow stepping out from beneath those whom it believes to be exploiting or suppressing it”. Even G.W. Choudhury, a Bengali academic who was a member of Yahya Khan’s cabinet and has strongly defended his military action in East Pakistan, concedes that ‘Bengali sub-nationalism or regionalism was…the product of a number of unfortunate and, in a sense, accidental factors connected with the internal political developments in the 1950s and 1060s, particularly after the eclipse of the democratic process of the country which denied the Bengalis their due share in the political process, and created an artificial situation which the majority group felt itself dominated by an elite from West Pakistan composed of top civil and military officials.’ Professor Choudhury however is strongly of the view that while the Bengalis were naturally resentful of the state of affairs there was no fundamental cleavage between the Muslims of the two wings of Pakistan, the internal tensions were ‘utilized by the hostile neighbor of Pakistan which not only divided the two parts of the country geographically but took an active role in aggravating the internal tensions of the country in the twin expectation of weakening its principal enemy and belying Jinnah’s two-nation theory, neither of which seemed to have been achieved by the partition of 1971’.
The late Mr. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy whose commitment to Pakistan is beyond question has recorded in his memoirs that East Pakistan had carried certain important grievances which could not be resolved by the mere allocation of large funds for development. He mentions that the money spent for defense purposes was obviously provided by both wings, but it was estimated that 98 percent of it was spent in West Pakistan or for West Pakistan personnel.’ Hence, there was a constant drain of funds from East Pakistan without any return, leading to improvement of the eastern wing.
Another distinguished Bengali politician, Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, in his memoirs speaks of the growing sense of deprivation of East Pakistan and maintains that in view of the resentment expressed by East Pakistan leadership, ‘people like Ayub Khan started saying that if East Pakistan wanted to leave the federation there should be no serious objection from the people of West Pakistan.’ He felt that ‘unless both wings with their problems stood together both would suffer’ but also believed that Pakistan’s defense problems stood insoluble with the attitude of India remaining unfriendly.
The timing of Major General (Retired) Rao Farman Ali’s demand for the constitution of a commission on the lines of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission, to get down to the bottom of the actual facts of the 1971 debacle, is certainly intriguing. It happens to coincide with an intermittent campaign on the part of certain political leaders to establish the Bhutto family as unpatriotic, motivated by anti-Pakistan sentiments. In his reported statement, the retired Major-General has attempted to absolve the late Gen Yahya Khan and his junta of their responsibility and held Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the guilty party.
This is not to suggest that the fateful events of 1971 should not have been properly investigated and the findings made public. The fact that the Hamoodur Rahman Commission’s report was kept secret, resulting in speculation and conjecture, seemed too much like a deliberate cover up. Whether Bhutto alone was responsible for that is anybody’s guess.
Major-General (Retired) Farman Ali’s suggestion that another Commission could still identify the factors leading to Pakistan’s breakup certainly merits consideration. If nothing else, this could determine the wisdom (or otherwise) of the persistent belief that the induction of the Army is the only way out of a mess created by politicians. The proposed investigation could also perhaps establish the basis of certain charges levelled against the retired Major-General himself about his role in the events of 1971. Kazi Anwarul Huque, a distinguished Bengali Civil Servant who held several key appointments in both wings of Pakistan before the breakup and has been a member of Bangladesh’s Council of Ministers under three successive Presidents. In his memoirs he has held Rao Farman Ali guilty of incredible crime. He maintained that the two ‘fanatical’ non-Bengali organizations, allegedly organized by the Major General towards the tail end of the East Pakistan crisis, were responsible for the cold-blooded murder of a number of university teachers and other intellectuals of Dhaka shortly before the Pakistan Army surrendered on 16 December 1971. The organizations were ostensibly set up to eliminate prominent Bengalis who were suspected of having collaborated with the ‘liberation’ movement. If Kazi Anwarul Huque’s statement is to be believed, the victims were picked up from their homes, taken to the outskirts of the city and mercilessly butchered. Kazi Sahib goes on to agree that Rao Farman Ali had also allegedly ‘planned’ to liquidate senior Bengali officers to cripple the Bangladeshi government which was to succeed the Pakistan government but was prevented by Governor A.M. Malik from proceeding with the sinister plot. These or similar charges have been heard time and again and it is high time the retired Major General was given the opportunity to clear his name.
A view has been expressed; and Kazi Anwarul Huque who served as Minister in Ayub Khan’s Cabinet shares it- that the secession of East Pakistan had it seeds in the war of 1965. It is argued that the isolation of East Pakistan during the war and the futility of the West Pakistan based defense strategy planned by Ayub Khan compelled the leaders of East Pakistan ‘to seek a remedy by which the interests of the province could be safeguarded by their own efforts.’ East Pakistani leadership believed in ‘a calculated move’ the military oligarchy during Ayub Khan’s regime wanted to keep its disputes with India alive in order to maintain themselves in power, oblivious of the interest of East Pakistan. This may be an extreme view, but the fact is the Six points outlined by Shaikh Mujibur Rehman began to gain support in East Pakistan not too long after the 1965 war.
Shaikh Mujibur Rehman’s Six points indeed portended a radical change in the inter-relationship between East and West Pakistan. With the breakup of One Unit and the doing away of the artificial basis of parity established in the 1956 constitution and maintained in Ayub Khan’s political order, the likelihood of a government by East Pakistan stared the power elite in Pakistan in the face. When the election campaign got into full swing in the latter part of 1970, certain elements in the West Pakistan carried on the propaganda that Bengali Muslims were not truly committed to Islam and were under the social and cultural domination of Hindus and India. Shaikh Mujibur Rehman had to declare that his political program in no way jeopardized the integrity of Pakistan or Islam. When the Awami league secured a clear majority in the constituent assembly, there was stated to be serious concern among Yahya Khan’s aides on two counts: for the continuation of the central government’s effective power, over riding provincial autonomy, and, more importantly, possible political interference by East Pakistan leadership in the matter of maintaining a military budget at current levels and in regard to recruitment, postings and promotions in the defense establishment. The military junta apparently felt that these critical matters would have to be part of a negotiated settlement between the regime and the Awami League leadership. This then was the compulsion for Gen Yahya Khan and his colleagues to commence a dialogue with Shaikh Mujibur Rehman and his aides before convening the National Assembly.
According to research conducted by two notable American academics, Professor Richard Sisson of University of California, Los Angeles, and Prof Lee E. Rose of University of California, Berkeley, (whom Rao Farman Ali has referred to in support of his theory that Butto and Shaikh Mujibur Rehman were the primary culprits in the debacle of 1971) maintain that Yahya Khan and his aides (all military officers) did not anticipate that the 1971 elections would give a clear majority to two separate political parties, totally polarized in their positions on the future constitution of Pakistan, in the two wings of the country. The junta expected the elections would lead to ‘a party configuration that would facilitate the protection of their interests.’ They were hoping that there would be a multiplicity of parties in the National Assembly, with no single party being dominant, which would result in a coalition government and perhaps leave room for manipulation from above. This did not happen.
Nevertheless, in his first full fledged meeting with Yahya Khan and his aides in January 1971, Shaikh Mujibur Rehman proposed that ‘to facilitate a constitutional consensus the members of the National Assembly should meet in Dhaka to discuss a draft constitution several days before the convening of the National Assembly and the draft incorporating suggestions from West Pakistani leaders would then be prepared for Yahya Khan to present to the Assembly.’ (Sisson and Lee) The Awami League leader, ‘in an effort to assuage the fears of the military,’ also indicated that he ‘would accommodate the corporate interests of the Pakistani army as well as the personal political interests of President Yahya Khan.’ In addition, Shaikh Mujibur Rehman explicitly stated that he intended to make Yahya Khan the next ‘elected’ President of Pakistan and that he would not reduce the size of the army. He further held out the assurance that no one from West Pakistan would be dismissed from either the military or the Civil Services. While not committing himself to any specific form of government, Mujib nevertheless affirmed that he would not impose any unwanted constitutional arrangements on the West Pakistan provinces. Nevertheless, the military junta reportedly remained less than enthusiastic about the prospect of the Awami League assuming power. They apparently believed that once power was transferred, there would be no leverage against the Awami League without constitutional guarantees and ‘the effective participation of a dependable counterpoise in the government.’ However, Gen Yahya Khan at the end of the January talks spoke of Shaikh Mujibur Rehman as the future Prime Minister of Pakistan.
That Yahya Khan acting under his own whims or on the advice of his military brass which surrounded him or of Bhutto within a few days chose to behave [am—siacally] about the Dhaka talks was of course his own responsibility. He then gave his backing to negotiations being held between the leaders of the People’s Party and the Awami League, something that did not lead to consensus, and only widened the gulf between East and West Pakistan. Yahya Khan then chose to yield to pressure from the PPP and postponed the date for the convening of the National Assembly-something which the Awami league leadership regarded as a point of no return. In a last-ditch effort to avert a postponement and complete breakdown of negotiations, Admiral Ahsan and Sahabzada Yaqub Khan Rao Farman tried to reach Yahya Khan on phone in Rawalpindi on Feb 28 (the assembly was due to meet on March 3). They were reportedly told to call Karachi where they were informed by a senior member of Yahya Khan’s staff that the President was ‘indisposed’. Admiral Ahsan then spoke to Gen Hamid, Chief of Army Staff, in Sialkot, urging him to inform the President of the gravity of the situation. Hamid’s reported response was that he was not ‘conversant’ with political matters. Later the same night, Adm Ahsan was relieved of his duties as Governor of East Pakistan and replaced by Gen Yaqub Khan. Yaqub Khan himself was replaced by Gen Tikka Khan a few days later. The rest is history, too well chronicled to need repetition. However, when all the relevant antecedents are viewed in their perspective, they leave little reason to presume that the ultimate responsibility for the subsequent chain of events was that of anyone other than Yahya Khan as President, Chief Martial Law Administrator, and chief negotiator with the contending leadership.
(This article was found among M.H.Askari’s papers which were bequeathed to me, it was in all likelihood never published nor does it carry a date indicating the year it was written.)
Shama Askari